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Abstract
There is a substantial number of cases where the a priori relationship between
products is not at all clear in the sense that although apparent to be clear substitutes
may turn out to be in fact complements, or vice-versa. This paper aims to study the
relationship between xed and mobile telephony in the United Kingdom and, in par-
ticular, address the question if mobile communications crowded out xed telephony
or if, on the other hand, the two types of communications are in fact complements.
We estimate a structural continuous-choice demand model following Pinkse et al.
(2002), Pinkse and Slade (2004), and Slade (2004) and we nd that at the current
di¤usion stage, xed and mobile communications appear to be complements. Given
that the model is micro-founded, we also address the question of how the evolution
of the price di¤erential between the two types of communication may, respectively,
a¤ect the welfare of consumers and rms. We nd that the continuation of these
price trends have substantial welfare benets for subscribers and at the same time
have no signicant impact on the prots for rms. Finally, we present some economic
policy implications, especially about the need to (de)regulate telecommunications
provision.
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1 INTRODUCTION
There is a substantial number of cases where the a priori relationship between products
is not at all clear in the sense that although apparent to be clear substitutes may turn out
to be in fact complements, or vice-versa. Examples include print and online newspapers
(Gentzkow, 2007), free le-sharing services and recorded music (Oberholzer and Strumpf,
2004; Blackburn, 2004; Rob and Waldfogel, 2006; Zentner, 2005), le-sharing services
and live concerts (Mortimer and Sorensen, 2005), public and private broadcast channels
(Berry and Waldfogel, 1999; Prat and Stromberg, 2005), and online and o­ ine retailing
(Goolsbee, 2001; Sinai and Waldfogel, 2004).
This paper aims to study the relationship between xed and mobile telephony and, in
particular, address the question if mobile communications crowded out xed telephony
or if, on the other hand, the two types of communications are in fact complements.
Historically, mobile phone service did not pose an attractive alternative to xed
service. Given its high relative price, mobile service was a luxury, not a substitute for
xed line. Mobile technology also lagged signicantly in nonprice terms: transmission
quality and geographic coverage were poor by xed-line standards. However, with time,
the costs of mobile telephony start dropping, allowing prices to fall and quality to rise.
Therefore, mobile became an increasingly attractive alternative to xed-line service.
Technically, mobile is a substitute because users can place and receive voice calls just as
they do with xed service. Ultimately, users can even opt for the mobile phone network
only.
An alternative view is that xed and mobile services are complementary. Indeed,
a call originating from mobile phones benets xed phone subscribers. Moreover, they
are also being beneted by the increase in mobile phones because the number of phones
that can be reached is increased.
There have been some prior studies analyzing the xed-mobile substitution. Rodini et
al. (2003) use a US household annual survey to study the mobile and xed telephony, and
nd only modest substitution between mobile subscription and the demand for second
lines. Sung et al. (2000) nd that the number of Korean mobile subscribers is positively
correlated with the number of xed-line disconnects, but negatively related to the number
of new xed-line connections, suggesting net substitution between the two services. This
pattern occurs even while the stock of xed lines is positively correlated with the number
of mobile subscribers, o¤ering evidence that the two services are complements. Ahn
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and Lee (1999) estimate demand for mobile access in Korea using more recent wireless
subscription data for 64 countries, and nd evidence of complementarity also using
aggregate data.
The empirical literature on telephony communications is also signicant in what
modelling is concerned, Doganolu and Grzybowski (2006) estimate a nested logit model
to estimate the demand for subscriptions of mobile telephony, whereas Lee et al. (2006)
estimate switching costs in the Korean mobile telecommunications using a random coef-
cients multinomial model. Okada and Hatta (1999) estimate an almost ideal demand
system for the Japanese telephony industry.
However, and even though in some settings the above approaches are clearly reason-
able, in cases where the identication of the degree of substitutability or complementary
among products is the key parameter of interest, they may be inappropriate. The main
drawback of the discrete-choice literature is that it tends to a priori restrict the di¤erent
products to be either strong substitutes, independent or strong complements, whereas
the continuous-choice setting, on the other hand, typically incorporates an add-hoc (and
not a structural) error term.
We propose to estimate a structural continuous-choice demand model following Pinkse
et al. (2002), Pinkse and Slade (2004), and Slade (2004). Our starting point is the spec-
ication of an indirect utility function from which, via Roys identity, a demand system
is derived. We estimate the model using market-level data on the UK xed and mobile
communications. The data consists of a rich market-level panel that includes information
on call volume, call revenues and network size from Ofcom - O¢ ce of Communications.
We complemented that data with information on the number of employees, operational
costs and costs with employees from the AMADEUS database. Lastly, income informa-
tion was obtained from the ONS - O¢ ce for National Statistics.
The UK market is of particular interest as the raw data is inconclusive about the rela-
tionship between xed and mobile communications. On one hand, the overall slowdown
in the proportion of mobile-only homes and the fact that calls to xed lines still consti-
tute the biggest share of an average subscribers mobile use suggests that mobile remains
primarily a complement to xed-line rather than a direct substitute for most consumers.
On the other hand, survey gures show that there is some element of substitution as
around a fth of consumers claim that they use their mobile as the main method of
making and receiving calls. The solution to the nature of this relationship is therefore
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an empirical issue we propose to address. Given that the model is micro-founded, we
also address the question of how the evolution of the price di¤erential between the two
types of communication may, respectively, a¤ect the welfare of consumers and rms.
Finally, we aim to propose some economic policy implications.
We nd that at the current di¤usion stage, xed and mobile communications appear
to be complements and that the continuation of these price trends have substantial
welfare benets for subscribers and ta the same time have no signicant impact on the
prots for rms.
The paper would proceed in ve sections. The UK communications market would
briey be described in section 2, whereas in section 3 we would discuss the relevant liter-
ature. In section 4, we would present the continuous-choice demand model and establish
estimation issues. In section 5, we would introduce the data, discuss identication and
present the results. Section 6 would conclude.
2 THE UK TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET
Currently, the telecommunications industry in the UK is represented by six main network
operators, two xed and four mobile.
In the mobile telephony market, the operators are Vodafone, O2 (acquired by Telefon-
ica in January 2006), T-Mobile (belonging to Deutsche Telecom) and Orange (belonging
to France Télécom). Vodafone and O2 (then as BT Cellnet) launched their networks
in 1985 (analog at rst). Orange and T-Mobile (then designated as One2One) entered
the market in 1994. After a slow start from these two last networks, since 2000 the four
operators became very similar in terms of market shares.
In the xed telephony market BT is still the biggest player with more 56% of the
volume of xed calls in 2005. NTL: Telewest, UKs largest cable-provider, with more
than 90% of the market, is the main rival of BT with a market share of near 14%. NTL:
Telewest resulted from the merger between NTL and Telewest in 2006, after discussions
commenced in late 2003. However, thanks to their geographically distinct areas, NTL
and Telewest had co-operated previously, as in re-directing potential customers living
outside their respective areas.
In 2005, the UK telecommunications market revenue was £ 46.6 billion, of which
£ 38.3 billion was retail revenue, which rose by 26,4% compared to 2001. Mobile telecoms
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FIGURE I - UK TELECOMS INDUSTRY RETAIL REVENUE
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comprised £ 13.1 billion (34%) of total retail telecoms revenue up from £ 7.9 billion in
2001  and xed line revenue fell from £ 12.4 billion in 2001 to £ 10.1 billion in 2005.
Internet (including broadband) rose by 100% to £ 3.4billion in the same period (see
Figure I). The O¢ ce for National Statistics estimates that the industry contributed
£ 22.4 billion in value added in 2003, equating to 2.2% of total UK gross value added.
The key driver of growth of the UK telecoms industry between 2001 and 2005 was
the mobile sector. This is most obviously demonstrated by the continued rise in the
total number of active subscriptions and call volumes (see Figure II). According to the
Ofcom annual report, the enhanced position of the mobile industry in the UK telecoms
landscape was achieved to some degree at the expense of the xed voice industry, sug-
gesting the existence of substitutability between these two types of services. Indeed, the
total number of xed exchange lines in the UK fell by 1.7% during 2005 to 34 million
(compared with 2001, the fall was of 4.5%). Fixed voice volumes also fell by 13,5% since
2001. These falls had been attributed to an increase in the number of households who
rely on mobile telephony as their sole means of access, but this trend appears to have
been halted in the last years. A new explanation is that it may be the reection of a
reduction in the number of second lines for internet access following continued migration
to broadband services.
The number of households that owned a xed phone but not a mobile phone dropped
to just 10% by 2006. However the proportion of homes that relied on mobile as their sole
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FIGURE II - TOTAL CALL VOLUMES
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FIGURE III - HOUSEHOLD PENETRATION OF FIXED AND MOBILE TELEPHONY
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means of telephony remained relatively small, standing at just 10% (see Figure III). And
it seems unlikely that mobile will replace xed telephone as the main household access
technology in the foreseeable future. The overall slowdown in the proportion of mobile-
only homes suggests that mobile remains primarily a complement to xed-line rather
than a direct substitute for most consumers. In fact, despite their continuing decline,
calls to xed lines still constitute the biggest share of an average subscribers weekly
mobile use, at 35% of all mobile calls (down from 48% in 2001). Nevertheless, survey
gures show that there is some element of substitution. Around a fth of consumers
claim that they use their mobile as the main method of making and receiving calls.
An interesting element of the debate on xed and mobile substitution is the price
di¤erential between the two services. The price di¤erential between average xed and
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FIGURE IV- COMPARISON OF AVERAGE AND MOBILE CALLS CHARGES
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mobile per-minute charges decreased slightly during 2005, however, mobile calls still cost
on average 2.3 times more per minute than xed calls, which may suggest that the two
technologies are not substitutes (see Figure IV).
3 RELEVANT LITERATURE
There is a substantial number of cases where the a priori relationship between products
is not at all clear in the sense that although apparent to be clear substitutes may turn out
to be in fact complements, or vice-versa. Examples include print and online newspapers
(Gentzkow, 2007), free le-sharing services and recorded music (Oberholzer and Strumpf,
2004; Blackburn, 2004; Rob and Waldfogel, 2006; Zentner, 2005), le-sharing services
and live concerts (Mortimer and Sorensen, 2005), public and private broadcast channels
(Berry and Waldfogel, 1999; Prat and Stromberg, 2005), and online and o­ ine retailing
(Goolsbee, 2001; Sinai and Waldfogel, 2004).
There have been some prior studies analyzing the xed-mobile substitution. Rodini et
al. (2003) use a US household annual survey to study the mobile and xed telephony, and
nd only modest substitution between mobile subscription and the demand for second
lines. Sung et al. (2000) nd that the number of Korean mobile subscribers is positively
correlated with the number of xed-line disconnects, but negatively related to the number
of new xed-line connections, suggesting net substitution between the two services. This
pattern occurs even while the stock of xed lines is positively correlated with the number
of mobile subscribers, o¤ering evidence that the two services are complements. Ahn
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and Lee (1999) estimate demand for mobile access in Korea using more recent wireless
subscription data for 64 countries, and nd evidence of complementarity also using
aggregate data.
There is also a literature that analyses the impact of xed phone on mobile phone
di¤usion. Gruber and Verboven (2001a), using a panel data on the whole history of the
industry for all members of the European Union, nd that the stock of xed phones
has a negative inuence on the di¤usion of mobile phones. On the other hand, Gruber
(2001) obtains the opposite result that mobile telecommunications are a complement to
xed line telecommunications rather than a substitute in Central and Eastern Europe.
Gruber and Verboven (2001b) extend the analysis to world data and look at a di¤erent
set of issues. Barros and Cadima (2000) study a complementary question, and nd a
negative e¤ect of the mobile phone di¤usion on the xed-link telephony penetration rate.
Taubman and Vagliasindi (2004) explore the substitution e¤ects between traditional
xed line and mobile services across Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union, and
nd evidence of some substitution in place at country level, but, at the enterprise level,
the complementary e¤ects dominate. Hamilton (2003) studies the African telecommu-
nications market and shows that is possible that mobile and main lines are sometimes
substitutes, and at other times complements in consumption, even where xed-line access
is low. Okada and Hatta (1999) show that, for the Japanese market, the substitution
e¤ect is substantial.
The empirical literature on telephony communications is also signicant in what
modelling is concerned. Doganolu and Grzybowski (2006) estimate a nested logit model
to estimate the demand for subscriptions of mobile telephony, whereas Lee et al. (2006)
estimate switching costs in the Korean mobile telecommunications using a random co-
e¢ cients multinomial model. Grzybowski (2007) uses a multinomial and mixed logit
model to estimate switching costs in mobile telephony. On the other hand, under the
continuous-choice setting Okada and Hatta (1999) estimate an Almost Ideal Demand
System for the Japanese telephony industry. Parker and Roeller (1997), though focused
on the mobile phone industry, estimate a structural model for the US mobile telephony in-
dustry to analyze the determinants of market conduct in the mobile telecommunications
industry, and Hausman (1999, 2000) estimates the elasticity of aggregate subscription
to mobile service in the 30 largest U.S. markets over the period 1988-1993.
However, and even though in some settings the above approaches are clearly reason-
able, in cases where the identication of the degree of substitutability or complementary
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among products is the key parameter of interest, they may be inappropriate. The main
drawback of the discrete-choice literature is that it tends to a priori restrict the di¤erent
products to be either strong substitutes, independent or strong complements, whereas
the continuous-choice setting, on the other hand, typically incorporates an add-hoc (and
not a structural) error term. We propose to estimate a structural continuous-choice de-
mand model following Pinkse et al. (2002), Pinkse and Slade (2004), and Slade (2004)
with distinct advantages over the models under the standard approaches.
4 THE DEMAND MODEL
We propose to estimate a structural continuous-choice demand model following Pinkse
et al. (2002), Pinkse and Slade (2004), and Slade (2004) with distinct advantages over
the models under the standard approaches.
Consider a choice framework with J inside options, j = 1; : : : ; J , and an outside
option, j = 0; that aggregates all other products. Within this setup, consumers choose
quantities for the set = of those J + 1 options.
The hth consumer, with h = 1; : : : ;H, chooses a vector qh = (qh1; : : : ; qhJ)
0 of quan-
tities for the inside options, with qhj  0; j = 1; : : : ; J; and qh0 for the outside option,
with qh0 > 0: Furthermore, this consumer has nominal income yh and indirect utility
function uh (~p; ~yh) ; where ~p = (p0; ~p1; : : : ; ~pJ)
0 denotes the vector of nominal prices for
the inside options and p0 denotes the nominal price of the outside option.
We approximate the unknown functional form of the consumer indirect utility func-
tion, uh, by a second-order approximation that does not restrict the price-substitution
patterns. In particular, we follow Berndt, Fuss and Waverman (1977) and McFadden
(1978), and opt to work with a symmetric quadratic functional form, where nominal
prices and income are normalized by the price of the outside option p0;
uh (p; yh) =
JX
i=1
piyh  
JX
i=1
ahipi  
JX
i=1
JX
j=1
bhijpipj ; (1)
where for notational convenience, we denote pi =
~pi
p0
; yh =
~yh
p0
and p = (p1; : : : ; pJ)
0 :
Proposition 1 Suppose uh (p; yh) satises   0 and yh   ahm   2
PJ
i=1 bhmipi  0
for all m and h. Then the above indirect utility function is a member of the class
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of consistent indirect utility functions, as it is i) a continuous function at all positive
nominal prices and income, ii) non-increasing in a given nominal price, non-decreasing
in nominal income, and homogeneous of degree zero in nominal prices and income, and
iii) a convex function of nominal prices with income normalized to one.
Proof. Follows straightforward from the derivatives of uh (p; yh).
Given proposition 1, the demand system can, therefore, be derived by Roys identity.
The demand function from individual h for a given product m is, then, given by,
qhm (p; yh) =  @uh (p; yh) =@pm
@uh (p; yh) =@yh
=  yh   ahm   2
PJ
i=1 bhmipiPJ
i=1 pi
; (2)
where for notational convenience, we denote pm =
~pm
p0
; yh =
~yh
p0
and p = (p1; : : : ; pJ)
0 :
The summation
P
i pi can be interpreted as a price index that can, without loss of
generality, be normalized to one in a cross-section or very short time series, yielding the
following demand function,
qhm (p; yh) = ahm + 2
JX
i=1
bhmipi   yh: (3)
Because the indirect utility function is in Gorman polar form, the market-level de-
mand functions can be obtained by simply aggregating the individual demand functions
across consumers,
qm (p; y) =
HX
h=1
qhm (p; yh) =
HX
h=1
ahm + 2
JX
j=1
pj
HX
h=1
bhmj   
HX
h=1
yh; (4)
where qm denotes the market-level demand function for productm; and y =
PH
h=1 yh de-
notes aggregate income. Let us denote also for notational convenience, am =
PH
h=1 ahm
and bmj = 2
PH
h=1 bhmj : Following this denitions, we can now rewrite the market-level
demand function as,
qm (p; y) = am +
JX
j=1
bmjpj   y: (5)
At this point, the aggregate demand function is completely deterministic. As it is
clear that some randomness exists in a applied demand model, we introduce the random
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utility hypothesis in a way akin to Pinkse et al. (2002). We assume, therefore, that
am is a function dened in the characteristics space of product m, am = a (xm; m) ;
where xm denotes a K-dimensional vector of characteristics of product m, observed by
both the consumer and the econometrician, and m denotes the value of products m
characteristics observed by the consumer but not by the econometrician. Although many
functional forms for a (xm; m) are possible, we will assume the function to be linear in
its arguments,
a (xm; m) =
KX
k=1
kxmk + m: (6)
Given the above mapping of the market-level demand function can be rewritten
as a function not only of prices and income, but also of a vector of characteristics
x = (x1; : : : ; xJ)
0,
qm (x; p; y) =
KX
k=1
kxmk +
JX
j=1
bmjpj   y + m: (7)
The unobserved characteristics m ensure that the error term is structurally embed-
ded in the model.
An important econometric issue that arises when the model is taken to data refers to
the substantial number of parameters to be estimated. This may lead to a dimensionality
problem. To see this do note that, in addition to the fkg and fig parameters, the
number of fbijg parameters to be estimated is J(J + 1)=2: We address this point by
following Pinkse et al. (2002), Pinkse and Slade (2004), and Slade (2004), and map the
fbijg parameters in the characteristics space. We assume, therefore, the fbiig parameters
to be a function of own-characteristics, bii = b (xi), and similarly the fbijg parameters,
for i 6= j; to depend on own- and cross-characteristics, bij = g (xi; xj) : In particular, we
will work with the following functional forms,
bii =
KdX
k=1
kxik
(8)
bij =
KcX
k=1
k

1
1 + 0:01 jxik   xjkj

;
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where Kd and Kc denote the number of characteristics included in the mapping of the
own- and cross-price terms, respectively.
Given availability of data with both cross-sectional m = 1; : : : ; J and time series
t = 1; : : : ; T variation, the model to be estimated becomes,
qmt (x; p; y) =
KX
k=1
kxmkt+
KdX
k=1
kxmkpmt+
KcX
k=1
X
j 6=m
k

1
1 + 0:01 jxmk   xjkj

pjt yt+mt;
(9)
A second econometric issue relates to an hypothetical correlation between the re-
gressors and the error term. We would expect prices and unobserved characteristics to
be correlated as prices are typically set taking into account some information that the
econometrician does not possess and, thereby, has to include in the econometric error
term. Due to this hypothetical correlation, OLS estimates may not be consistent and
instrumental variables techniques are, therefore, required. We assume, however, as it is
standard in the literature, the unobserved characteristics to be mean independent of the
observed ones (please see Berry, 1994).
In many policy applications, including merger simulation, the key object of interest
is the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities. The analytical expressions for the own-
and cross-price elasticities predicted by the model for any given products m and n; are
the following,
"mn (x; p; y) =
8>>><>>>:
PKd
k=1 kxmk

pm
qm(x;p;y)

for m = n
PKc
k=1 k

1
1+0:01jxmk xjkj

pn
qm(x;p;y)

for m 6= n
(10)
As the model is exible in the sense that there exists a vector of parameters that
can match any matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities (please see Pinkse et al., 2002,
Pinkse and Slade, 2004 and Slade, 2004), it can be instrumental in determining the
relationship between two given products.
Denition 1 Products m and n; for all m 6= n; are substitutes if @qm(x;p;y)@pn > 0; inde-
pendent if @qm(x;p;y)@pn = 0; and complements if
@qm(x;p;y)
@pn
< 0:
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5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 Data Description
The empirical application of the above estimation procedure relies on the availability of
data on prices, income, observed quantities and characteristics for a set of J products
across time.
In what refers to our UK communications application, we collected information on
call volume, call revenues and network size from Ofcom - O¢ ce of Communications.
The data is on the form of a market-level cross-sectional time series for the United
Kingdom telecoms market, and it is disaggregated by operator (BT, Vodafone, O2, ...)
and quarter (from 2003:1 to 2005:4). Furthermore, we complemented that data with
information on the number of employees, operational costs and costs with employees
from the AMADEUS database. Lastly, income information was obtained from the ONS
- O¢ ce for National Statistics.
Table I presents some summary statistics for call volumes, call revenues, network size
and, lastly, for a derived price variable computed as the ratio of revenues to the respective
volume. The last two columns show the percentage of the standard deviation due to
product and quarterly di¤erences, with most of the variation being due to di¤erences
across products.
TABLE I - SUMMARY STATISTICS
Mean Std
Product
Variation
Quarter
Variation
Call Volume (millions of minutes) 12,092 16,781 106% 24%
Call Revenue (£ millions) 776 538 107% 15%
Price (£ ) 0.115 0.055 108% 11%
Network (000s) 14,550 6,883 108% 12%
Given the high degree of product di¤erences we present in Table II again the mean
and standard deviation of the above variables, but now disaggregated between mobile
and xed communications.
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TABLE II - DISAGGREGATED MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Mean Std
Mobile Fixed Mobile Fixed
Call Volume (millions of minutes) 3,891 28,493 461 21,160
Call Revenue (£ millions) 594 1,140 117 811
Price (£ ) 0.152 0.041 0.169 0.004
Network (000s) 13,707 16,235 948 11,831
Table II shows i) that in fact exist a structural di¤erence between mobile and xed
communications, ii) that within mobile rms the similarity, apart from revenues and
consequently price, tends to be relatively high whereas iii) the same does not happen
for xed products as BT remains the biggest player with more than 56% of the volume
of the xed calls market in 2005. As a result our model has to take this aspect into
consideration.
5.2 Reduced-form Results
Figure II shows that during these last years, the volume of xed voice calls has been
declining, while the volume of mobile voice calls has been increasing. A simple OLS
regression of xed voice volume on mobile voice volume and a time trend gives a sig-
nicantly negative coe¢ cient. Results are presented in Table III. Although it might be
tempting to take this as direct evidence that the xed and mobile telephony are substi-
tutes, several factors make such a conclusion dubious. Our goal is to use a micro-founded
demand model to answer this question.
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TABLE III - FIXED/MOBILE CORRELATION
Variable
MOBILE VOLUME -3.070 **
(-2.20)
TREND -2,230 ***
(-8.65)
CONSTANT 119,257 ***
(5.71)
R-squared 0.957
FIXED VOLUME as independent variable.
Asymptotically robust t-ratios in parentheses.
We can also nd evidence about the extent of substitutability among operators of-
fering di¤erent products. Table IV reports correlation coe¢ cients for each pair of mo-
bile/xed operator.
TABLE IV - VOLUME CORRELATIONS
Pairs Correlation p  value
BT/Vodafone -16.915 0.000
BT/O2 -3.825 0.161
BT/T-mobile 12.113 0.030
BT/Orange -7.932 0.098
ntl:Telewest/Vodafone -1.981 0.000
ntl:Telewest/O2 -0.774 0.019
ntl:Telewest/T-mobile 1.347 0.118
ntl:Telewest/Orange -0.736 0.309
Calls from BT are signicantly negatively correlated with calls from Vodafone. How-
ever, they are signicantly positively correlated with calls from T-Mobile. With respect
to the other mobile operators the correlation is not signicant.
The correlation between ntl:Telewest and Vodafone is also signicantly negative, as is
the correlation between ntl:Telewest and O2. The other correlations are not signicantly
di¤erent from zero. These results suggest some ambiguity about the relationship between
mobile and xed calls. Again, this is exactly the question we propose to address with
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our paper by estimating a structural continuous-choice demand model. Let us proceed
now with the econometric issues of its estimation.
5.3 Identication
The demand specication from equation (9) may give rise to an hypothetical correlation
between the regressors and the error term .First, we would expect prices and unobserved
characteristics to be correlated as prices are typically set taking into account some in-
formation that the econometrician does not possess and, thereby, has to include in the
econometric error term. Furthermore, in a dynamic setting, an hypothetical correlation
problem between observed and unobserved characteristics may also exist. As a result
of these hypothetical problems, OLS estimates could be inconsistent and instrumental
variables techniques are, therefore, required.
Our estimation procedure relies on two identication assumptions. First, we will
assume, as it is standard in the literature, the unobserved characteristics to be mean
independent of the observed ones (please see Berry, 1994). Second, in what relates to the
hypothetical correlation between prices and unobserved product characteristics, we will
assume two operational ratios to be valid instruments: the ratio of operational costs to
volume and the ratio of costs with employees to their respective number. The justication
for these instruments relies on their likelihood to be simultaneously correlated with prices
(via the rmscost structure) and uncorrelated with unobserved product characteristics.
5.4 Demand Estimation
Table V presents the OLS and IV results for the estimation of the continuous-choice
demand model1. As we described before, both the intercepts and the own-price terms are
functions of observed characteristics, whereas the cross-price terms depend on distance
measures. The rst column presents, for comparison purposes, the OLS results, whereas
the second column presents the IV estimates. The table shows that the OLS estimates
of the coe¢ cients tend to be smaller than the IV estimates, as in Slade (2004).
1For the estimation results presented, the revenues include also those from xed fees included in the
price schemes. As a robustness check, we re-estimated the model using only revenues from the variable
part of the price schemes. The results do not change signicantly.
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For the intercepts, the only observed characteristics included were product dummies
to control for all those product specic characteristics that do not vary with time and
time period dummies to control for time variations.
TABLE V - DEMAND ESTIMATION RESULTS
Variable (OLS) (IV)
PRICE -1,250,688 *** -1,293,902 ***
(-11.83) (-9.44)
PRICEM 1,092,271 *** 1,028,032 ***
(8.05) (4.84)
PRICEN 9.417 ** 11.710 *
(2.28) (1.98)
DIFNSAME 5,656 24,329 *
(1.49) (1.75)
DIFNOTOHER -611,257 *** -614,913 ***
(-6.46) (-5.32)
INCOME -0.044 -0.055
(-1.03) (-0.93)
Product Dummies yes yes
Time Dummies yes yes
First stage F  
R-squared 0.997 
All regressions are based on 128 observations.
Asymptotically robust t-ratios in parentheses.
In what the own-price e¤ects is concerned, we considered the following specication
for the mapping of the fbiig parameters,
bii = 0 + 1DMOBILEi + 2NETWORKi; (11)
where DMOBILEi denotes a dummy variable that takes the value one if the product
i is a mobile network and zero otherwise, and NETWORKi denotes the number of
subscribers of product i. Given this specication, an estimate of the fg parameters
can be obtained as the estimated coe¢ cients on price, on price interacted with the
DMOBILE variable (PRICEM ) and lastly on price interacted with the NETWORK
variable (PRICEN ), respectively. The price coe¢ cient is negative and signicant. The
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coe¢ cients on both PRICEM and PRICEN are positive and signicant (although the
later only at at 6%) suggesting that own-price sensitivity is lower for mobile and large
size networks, respectively.
Turning to the cross-price e¤ects, captured by the fbiig parameters, we assumed the
following mapping which incorporates a mixture of a discrete- with a continuous-distance
measure,
bij = (0DSAMEij + 1DOTHERij)

1
1 + 0:01 jNETWORKi  NETWORKj j

;
(12)
where DSAMEij denotes a dummy variable that takes the value one if products i and
j are of the same type, for example both xed or mobile operators and zero other-
wise, and conversely DOTHERij denotes a dummy variable that takes the value one if
products i and j belong to di¤erent types. This mapping gives rise to two rival price vari-
ables. One that considered the weighted average of those products that are of the same
type (DIFNSAME) and another considering the weighted average of those products
that are of di¤erent types (DIFNOTOHER). In summary, the former variable allows
us to obtain the cross-price e¤ects intra-categories, while the later gives us the inter-
categories cross-price e¤ects, in our case, between mobile and xed calls. The coe¢ cient
on DIFNSAME is positive and signicant (although only at at 9%) implying that
products of the same type are estimated to be substitutes. Conversely, the coe¢ cient on
DIFNOTOHER is negative and signicant suggesting that products of di¤erent types
are estimated to be complements.
A caveat should be emphasized about the validity of the estimated relationship be-
tween mobile and xed communications. The data used in this paper refers to a mature
di¤usion stage of mobile communications. We do not argue that mobile and xed com-
munications are and always have been complements in what the UK market is concerned.
Our point, in contrast, is that at this stage of mobile communication di¤usion charac-
terized by a stabilization of the relative market shares, the data suggests that the two
types of communications are complements.
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Lastly, the coe¢ cient on income is not signicant, implying that at the current stage
of di¤usion income tends to not be important in explaining the volume of minutes.
Table VI presents the implied demand elasticities for the continuous-choice model.
According to our empirical specication, own-price elasticities vary with the character-
istics of the products, whereas cross-price elasticities depend on distance measures.
The implied own-price elasticities show that consumers tend to react in a similar
way to own-price changes from mobile rms. In contrast, in the xed communica-
tions market, there is a substantial within di¤erence as the own-price elasticity for BT
implies a relatively high degree of market power. In what the implied cross-price elas-
ticities is concerned, the results suggest communications of the same type are demand
substitutes, whereas communications of di¤erent types are demand complements. Fur-
thermore, within each type the results also imply that consumers tend to switch more
towards products with similar network sizes.
If we use the individual rms elasticities to compute elasticities for xed and mobile
telephony in aggregate terms, we obtain the median own- and cross-price elasticities
presented in Table VII.
TABLE VII - MEDIAN AGGREGATED ELASTICITIES
Mobile Fixed
Mobile -2.319 -1.036
Fixed -1.011 -1.497
Each cell gives the % change in market share of the rows product
with a 1% change in the price of the columns product.
In aggregated terms, mobile calls demand is therefore slightly more elastic than xed
calls with respect to own-price. A caveat should be emphasized about these results:
their magnitude of these results seem somewhat higher than some previous studies in the
literature. However we have to emphasize that we were a priori expecting this qualitative
result as the elasticities refer to i) volume and not subscription and ii) quarterly and
not monthly data. Rodini et al. (2003) estimate a own-price elasticity of mobile access
demand with respect to the monthly charge is -0.43. Hausman (1999) reports a price
elasticity of subscription of -0.51 in the 30 largest U.S. markets. From the Ahn and Lee
(1999) study it is possible to infer a elasticity of -0.36. Regarding xed lines subscription,
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the own-price elasticity is -0.65 for the second xed line and -0.1 for rst xed line,
according to Rodini et al. (2003). Parker and Röller (1997) apply a structural model
in order to examine the competitive behavior of mobile operators, and nd an own-
price elasticity of -2.5 using data on the United States covering the period 1984-1988.
Doganoglu and Grzybowski (2005) estimate demand for subscription and nds own-price
elasticities between -4.2 and -5.04.
Turning to the cross-price, it seems there is no signicant di¤erence between how
the volume of xed communications reacts to changes in the mobile and vice-versa.
Again a similar caveat applies as the data refers to i) volume and not subscription,
ii) quarterly and not monthly data and iii) to a mature di¤usion stage for mobile
communications. Rodini et al. (2003) estimates a cross-price elasticity of xed access
price on mobile demand of 0.13-0.18 and a cross-price elasticity from mobile access to
xed line subscription of 0.06-0.08.
5.5 Welfare Evaluation
Figure IV presents the evolution from 2001 to 2005 of the price di¤erential between xed
and mobile communications. The price di¤erential has decrease around 30% during that
period and it was mainly due to the 22% decrease in the price of mobile communications
(against a decrease of 7% in the price of xed communications). It would be therefore of
interest to evaluate the welfare change for both consumers and producers if those past
trends in prices were to continue.
In what consumer welfare is concerned, when all consumers have indirect utility
functions of the Gorman polar form, the preferences of the representative consumer
are independent of the social welfare function used. In particular, the following is an
admissible indirect utility function for the normative representative consumer (Mas-
Colell et al., 1995),
u (p; y) =
HX
h=1
uh (p; yh) =
JX
i=1
piy  
JX
i=1
aipi  
JX
i=1
JX
j=1
bijpipj ; (13)
As a result, we can use our demand side estimates of ; faig and fbijg to compute
the impact the price trends had on utility. However, given changes in utility have no
direct interpretation, it is necessary to translate those utility variations into a monetary
measure. A well-known measure of monetary welfare change is the equivalent variation
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(EV) following Hicks (1939). This measure gives us the change in income that would be
equivalent to the price change in order for the welfare to be kept unchanged,
u
 
p0; y + EV

= u
 
p1; y

; (14)
where p0 and p1 denote the vector of prices for all communication products in the market
before and after the price changes, respectively.
Let us now turn to producer welfare. For rms the change in welfare can be computed
as the change in prot. Assume that the prot of a given rm f can be expressed as
follows,
f = (pf  mcf )Df (p)  Cf ; (15)
where pf ; mcf and Cf denote respectively price, constant marginal cost and xed cost of
production for rm f . Additionally Df (p) denotes the volume demand of rm f , which
is a function of prices of all communication products in the market, p. Given the above,
the impact on prot from a price change would be,
f = p
1
fDf
 
p1
  p0fDf  p0 mcf  Df  p1 Df  p0 ; (16)
where the superscript 0 and 1 refer to variables before and after the price changes,
respectively. The demand after the price changes can be predicted using the estimates
from the demand side. However data on marginal costs, which we do not have, is
instrumental. As a result we can only perform a scenario analysis where we compute
the change in prots conditional on di¤erent marginal costs. We can argue that the
marginal cost of a minute of communication is very close to zero if there are no capacity
constraints issues. For this reason, we analyzed the impact on prots for the cases where
the marginal costs are 5%, 10% and 20% of the consumer price.
Table VIII presents the welfare impact results for both consumers and producers as
a result of hypothetical future price trends. The rst column presents the impact if past
trends were to continue for a year, whereas the second column presents the results if
those trends were to continue for a ve year period.
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TABLE VIII - WELFARE IMPACT OF COMMUNICATION PRICE TRENDS
1 Year 5 Years
Consumer welfare change in £ per subscriber per day £ 0.45 £ 3.13
Prot change in £ per subscriber per day for mobile rms
mcf = 0:05pf £ 0.00 £ 0.00
mcf = 0:10pf £ 0.00 £ 0.00
mcf = 0:20pf £ 0.00 £ 0.00
Prot change in £ per subscriber per day for xed rms
mcf = 0:05pf £ 0.00 £ 0.00
mcf = 0:10pf £ 0.00 £ 0.00
mcf = 0:20pf £ 0.00 £ 0.00
The welfare impact was computed using 2005:4 values as comparison.
We nd that on average a subscriber would be willing to pay £ 0.45 per day for the
observed past decrease in prices to continue at the same rate for one year and £ 3.13
per day for the continuation of those price trends to continue for a ve year period. In
what the supply side is concerned, we nd that rms have no benet in continuing in
the future with price trends of the same magnitude. This nding is consistent with a
reasonable range of marginal costs.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the relationship between xed and mobile telephony in the United
Kingdom and, in particular, addresses the question if mobile communications crowded
out xed telephony or if, on the other hand, the two types of communications are in fact
complements.
We estimate a structural continuous-choice demand model following Pinkse et al.
(2002), Pinkse and Slade (2004), and Slade (2004) and nd that at the current di¤usion
stage, xed and mobile communications appear to be complements. Furthermore, we
nd the continuation observed price trends for both types of communications would
have substantial welfare benets for subscribers, at the same time it would not decrease
prots for rms.
It is a known fact that competition generally tends to improve industry performance
and productivity. Studies that looked at the telecommunications industry have nd
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that competition in basic services is associated with increased telecom growth and de-
velopment. By this reason, substitutability between xed and mobile telephony services
impacts public policy toward competition in both these markets. The main concern over
competition in these markets derives from the market power held by incumbent xed
network. Our estimates indicate that mobile calls are not substitute, but a complement
for xed calls. Therefore we cannot expect the mobile services to constrain the market
power of BT. On the contrary, the two services appear to coexist in households, each
providing consumers with particular advantages. Hence, policies promoting the opening
up of incumbents network aided by regulatory intervention are still necessary.
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